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Abstract: In this paper, a new hierarchical software architecture is proposed to improve the safety and reliability
of a safety-critical drone system from the perspective of its source code. The proposed architecture uses formal
verification methods to ensure that the implementation of each module satisfies its expected design specification, so
that it prevents a drone from crashing due to unexpected software failures. This work builds on top of a formally
verified operating system kernel, CertiKOS(Gu et al., 2015). Since device drivers are considered the most important
parts affecting the safety of the drone system, this paper mainly focuses on verifying bus drivers such as the SPI driver
and the I2C driver in a drone system using a rigorous formal verification method(Chen et al., 2016). Experiments
have been carried out to demonstrate the improvement in reliability in case of device anomalies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, small unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) or drones have drawn more and more atten-
tion because of their low cost, compact size. As
small UAVs come into our daily life, safety concerns
are also rising. Failures of a drone may result in se-
vere damage to the environment and serious injury
to the public(Simpson and Stoker, 2006).
Aside from maneuver mistakes, software errors
in the controller are also one of the main reasons
for UAVs failures. The fault may come from the al-
gorithm itself or its actual implementation(Malecha
et al., 2016). A lot of work has been done to improve
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the reliability of UAV systems. Most efforts have
focused on algorithms, such as improving modeling
accuracy(Leishman, 2002), enhancing the robustness
of control algorithms(Lee et al., 2010), and reducing
sensor errors(Marina et al., 2012). In 2013, Réti pro-
posed a hardware solution to improve the safety by
developing a smart mini actuator which integrated
measurements of position and angular rate with con-
trolling microprocessors(Réti et al., 2013). Few peo-
ple so far have addressed bugs in the implementation
of algorithms at the source code level. For a safety-
critical real-time system like an UAV, this negligence
could result in problems such as loss of synchro-
nization (caused by irregular response from external
sensors) and high approximation errors (caused by
floating-point computation)(Malecha et al., 2016).
These problems are subtle but might degrade the
performance or even cause the drone to crash.
Formal verification is a technique to conduct
correctness proof of a program (or the contradic-
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tion if the program contains errors) in accurate and
well-formed mathematical and logical constructs. It
is used to prevent subtle errors in the source code
of control systems (Ricketts et al., 2015; Malecha
et al., 2016; Bohrer et al., 2018). Preventing such
errors would increase the reliability and safety of
drone systems. In 2015, foundational verification
techniques in the theorem prover Coq, were applied
to a quadrotor system to verify the correctness of two
shims (saturation blocks) that were used to limit the
velocity and height of the quadrotor(Ricketts et al.,
2015). In 2016, the same research group verified
a runtime monitor in order to provide strong guar-
antees about maximum velocities and accelerations
of a drone(Malecha et al., 2016). In 2018, Bran-
don Bohrer (Bohrer et al., 2018) designed a verified
pipeline for generating concrete controller code from
high-level models. However, these efforts for for-
mally verifying control systems are not enough for a
hybrid real-time drone system.
Real-time operating system (RTOS) plays an
important role in scheduling real-time processes and
interacting with devices. Traditional RTOSes, in-
cluding Nuttx(Nutt, 2007) and FreeRTOS(Barry,
2003), perform well in real-time scheduling. Some
of them also support memory protection to improve
the security(Wang, 2017). However, none of them
has provided a formal correctness proof of its source
code.
A potential source of software failures lies in the
implementation of device drivers. The driver has to
rely on the behavior of that device, for instance, to
tell when it is ready to read or write data, or whether
a previous write is complete or not. However, due
to the complexity of modern hardware, it is difficult
to consider all possible abnormal situations when im-
plementing the device driver. For example, it is com-
mon for a driver to loop until some status bit on the
device is set. If the device does not update this bit
in time, then this delays the execution of the driver,
and potentially blocks the whole system if the driver
runs in the kernel mode and is not interruptible.
The main contribution of this paper includes
a new software architecture for improving the re-
liability and safety of drone systems at the source
code level by introducing formal verification tech-
niques. In particular, the proposed architecture is
based on CertiKOS (Certified Kit Operating Sys-
tem)(Gu et al., 2015), which enjoys a formal func-
tional correctness guarantee. We adopt this method-
ology and formally verify the device driver for a drone
control system layer by layer, and demonstrate that
this indeed improves its safety and reliability. The
same architecture could be extended to autonomous
cars, home service robots and other safety-critical
systems.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the proposed software architecture. Section
3 describes the formal verification of driver modules.
Experiments and discussions are presented in Section
4.
2 HIERARCHICAL SOFTWARE
ARCHITECTURE
In order to improve the reliability and safety of
the software stack of a drone system, a new hier-
archical software architecture is proposed (as shown
in Fig. 1). In this architecture, an operating sys-
tem kernel, CertiKOS(Chen et al., 2016), plays the
central role of managing devices such as motors and
sensors, and scheduling user tasks such as the control
loop, the sensor fusion program, etc.
Fig. 1 Overall software architecture
A Raspberry Pi3 board is equipped on the drone
as its main controller, which connects with multiple
sensors and actuators through general purpose I/O
(GPIO) pins. CertiKOS-ARM, the ARM port of
CertiKOS, is installed on the board to manage these
devices, either directly or through bus drivers, and
to expose them to user space programs. During each
control period, the sensor fusion algorithm reads
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from sensors to generate a reliable attitude estima-
tion. Then the controller decides its next movement
and writes control signals to corresponding motors.
There is also an RC task which reads the receiver
to get control signals from the remote controller. In
this way, the reliability of a drone system depends
heavily on the correctness of its device drivers.
In the proposed architecture, all software mod-
ules including the kernel and device drivers should
be formally verified in order to ensure the functional
correctness of their source code. CertiKOS has been
formally verified on x86 in previous work (Gu et al.,
2015), and its implementation has been ported to the
ARM architecture successfully. This paper mainly
focuses on verification of device drivers for the drone
system. It relies on the partially verified CertiKOS-
ARM, which includes modules for memory manage-
ment (verified), thread management (not verified),
etc.
3 DRIVER VERIFICATION
In a typical drone control system, it is neces-
sary and important to estimate the drone attitude
accurately. Raw data for the drone attitude esti-
mation are usually provided by three sensors: ac-
celerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer. In our
system, the accelerometer and gyroscope depend on
the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus to trans-
mit sensing signals, and the magnetometer uses the
Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) bus.
Following the same methodology as presented in
(Chen et al., 2016), the driver verification can be di-
vided into three phases. Firstly, we build a bus model
which abstracts machine registers and the physical
memory into a state transition system. Afterwards,
we define an abstract interface for reading and writ-
ing the bus, as shown in Fig. 2.
During the second phase, we divide the C code
of the device driver into multiple layers according to
their functionalities and dependencies, as shown in
Fig. 2. We further convert these individual C func-
tions into their corresponding Clight(Leroy, 2009)
abstract syntax tree, so that we can reason about
their behaviors by utilizing the Clight semantics (It
is actually an extended semantics as detailed in (Gu
et al., 2015)). The set of abstract syntax tree imple-
menting a layer is called a module, i.e. Mn in Fig.
2.
Fig. 2 Driver verification structure
Next, we abstract each C function into a Coq
function (which is called a specification or a prim-
itive), while still capturing everything we want to
know about the behavior of its source code. This is
achieved by following the approach of deep specifi-
cations (Gu et al., 2015). Then we define invariants
for each layer, and prove that all primitives preserve
these invariants , so that the higher layer will only
operate on valid states of its underlay.
It is not straightforward to prove the refinement
between the module and its specification (Highspec)
in one step. Hence, we follow (Gu et al., 2015) and
introduce the Lowspec to bridge the gap. While
Highspec focuses on the abstract states and high-
level invariants, the Lowspec deals with the memory
state and low-level invariants. The set of Highspecs
constitutes the abstract layer of the corresponding
module, which is relied upon by other modules. On
the other hand, Lowspec is only used for simplifying
the refinement proof and hidden from higher layers.
The final phase is the verification of each driver,
based on the bus model and abstract bus driver lay-
ers obtained from the first two steps. Two refine-
ments have to be proved in each abstract layer(Gu
et al., 2015): <1> the refinement from Lowspec to
Highspec; <2> each module correctly implements
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its Lowspec. If any of the conditions are not satis-
fied, we adjust either the Lowspec or the original C
code until all modules are verified. Then the deep
specification framework links the verification of all
layers together to achieve a verified program. This
guarantees the functional correctness of our adjusted
C code of device drivers, which in turn contributes
to the reliability and safety of the drone system.
3.1 The bus model
The characteristics of the bus in an actual physi-
cal system depend on the I/O operations of the CPU
and its interactions with the external sensor. Hence,
the SPI/I2C bus could be modeled as finite state
transition systems interacting with the CPU and ex-
ternal sensors. Different I/O operations or external
sensor events lead to different corresponding changes
to the state. Bus transitions (i.e. Trans in Fig.
2) therefore include these two types of interactions
(Chen et al., 2016).
Notice that the CPU carries out read/write op-
erations on bus registers through the I/O command.
We model these operations on both the SPI and I2C
bus as in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (CPU Operation on Bus)
O::= input n
| output n v
O::= input n denotes reading a value from the
register whose address is n. O::= output n v means
the CPU writes a value v to the register at address
n.
The following subsections describe definitions of
the state machine for I2C and SPI, and how they are
updated by CPU operations and external actions.
3.1.1 The I2C bus model
In order to formally define the I2C bus model,
we first construct its abstract state.
Definition 2 (The I2C bus abstract state)
Record I2CState :=
mkI2CState {
I2C_OA: Z
I2C_SA: Z
I2C_RX_DATA: Z
I2C_TX_DATA: Z
...
}
Although the physical bus hardware is sophisti-
cated and contains many more states and operating
modes, most of them are irrelevant regarding the at-
tached sensor, such as the 10-bits addressing mode,
high-speed mode, etc. Therefore, we fix its opera-
tion to the 7-bit addressing mode, and only abstract
10 registers (Definition 2) to formalize the state of a
physical I2C bus. These include the base address of
the device interface state I2C_OA and slave address
state I2C_SA, which serve as identities when connect-
ing to specific devices. We also model the data re-
ceiving buffer state I2C_RX_DATA and the data send-
ing buffer state I2C_TX_DATA to describe the read-
/write buffer in a real I2C bus, etc.
Based on Definition 1 and Definition 2, we de-
fine the CPU’s read/write operations for I2C bus as
Definition 3.
Definition 3 (I2C state transition function based on
CPU operation)
δCPUI2C(op: O) (s: I2CState) : I2CState :=
| op = input n -> s
| op = output n v -> s{I2C_OA: v}, if n = I2C_OA
s{I2C_SA: v}, if n = I2C_SA
...
Function δCPUI2C describes the interaction between
CPU and I2C bus, which takes the CPU operation
op: O and the current state as arguments, and re-
turns the resulting state after this operation. A read
operation (op= input n) does not change the I2C
state. A write operation (op= output n v) updates
the corresponding field in the abstract state to v.
As mentioned previously, besides I/O opera-
tions issued by the CPU, external sensor events may
also affect the state of I2C bus. There are three kinds
of events for I2C bus as listed in Definition 4: non-
event, acknowledgment responding event and data
receiving event.
Definition 4 (I2C external sensor event)
EenvI2C::= NullEvent
| ACKEvent
| RecvEvent(val: Z)
NullEvent represents a non-event in which
the I2C bus is waiting for other functional events.
ACKEvent represents the acknowledgment respond-
ing event in which the I2C bus receives an acknowl-
edgment. RecvEvent denotes the data receiving
event in which the I2C bus receives an integer data
val.
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Based on Definition 2 and Definition 4, we model
state transitions of the I2C bus triggered by external
events as Definition 5.
Definition 5 (The I2C state transition function
based on external sensor events)
δenvI2C(e: EenvI2C)(s: I2CState) : I2CState :=
| s, if e = NullEvent
| s, if e = ACKEvent
| s′, if e = RecvEvent(val)
The acknowledgment responding event and the
non-event will not change the I2C state. For receiv-
ing event, the I2C bus receives an integer data val,
and copies this value to the register I2C_RX_DATA as
shown in the following function:
δenvI2C(e: EenvI2C)(s: I2CState) : I2CState :=
| s, if e = NullEvent
| s, if e = ACKEvent
| s{I2C_RX_DATA: val}, if e = RecvEvent(val)
Notice that in the I2C bus model, an external
sensor event list lenvI2C is also constructed to decide the
order of all events being processed by the CPU. At
the same time, a local event log, Fig. 2, is set up
to record events which are already processed in the
event list.
Once state transition functions of the I2C bus
model are defined, we connect transitions caused by
CPU operations with transitions triggered by exter-
nal events to model the overall effect of reading/writ-
ing the I2C bus. And they constitute the interface
for the device driver to interact with the I2C bus.
Definition 6 (The I2C bus read semantics)
(e,l′i) = next(l
env
I2C,li)
s′ = δenvI2C(s,e)
res = κ(n,s′)
s′′ = δCPUI2C(s′,(input n))
In Definition 6, we first find the next event e
to handle by comparing the event list lenvI2C with lo-
cal event log li, which is denoted by the function
next(lenvI2C,li). Then, we apply the I2C state tran-
sition function δenvI2C on the event e and the cur-
rent I2C state s to obtain the next I2C state s′.
The next step is to obtain the value res from the
abstract state s′ and register address n. Finally,
we update the I2C state again through the state
transition function δCPUI2C . Given all above premises,
semantics of reading the I2C bus is defined as:
read(n,s,li,lenvI2C)=(res, s
′′, l′i).
Similarly, the following defines the write seman-
tics on the I2C bus.
Definition 7 (The I2C bus write semantics)
(e, l′i) = next(l
env
I2C,li)
s′ = δenvI2C(s,e)
s′′ = δCPUI2C(s
′,(output n v))
write(n,v,li,lenvI2C)=(s
′′,l′i)
This concludes the definition of the I2C bus
model, which is relied upon by the verification of
device drivers explained in the next subsection.
3.1.2 The SPI bus model
The SPI bus is modeled by the same approach.
Definition 8 (The SPI bus abstract state)
Record SPIState :=
mkSPIState {
SpiRx: Z
SpiTx: Z
SpiEn: bool
SpiMs: SPI_MS
...
}
In the SPI Bus model, integer elements SpiRx
and SpiTx represent the data receive buffer and data
transmit buffer of the actual physical SPI bus, which
are abstracted from the data receive register and the
transmit register, respectively. The boolean field
SpiEn is an abstraction for modeling SPI enabling
status. In summary, the SPI bus abstract state con-
tains a total of 25 fields, and they are used in our
drone control system.
3.2 Layer structure of the driver code
As mentioned at the beginning of this section,
we follow (Chen et al., 2016) and divide the bus
driver code into layers based to their functionalities
and dependencies to enable the compositional ver-
ification. Three principles are followed during this
process: <1> similar functions, such as read/write
a register, should be put in the same layer; <2>
one layer should not contain too many functions, to
make the proof easier; <3> such layering should not
change the overall behavior of the source code. We
show the layer structure of the SPI bus driver, while
the layering of the I2C bus driver is similar.
In Fig. 3, each block represents one module
in the layer. For example, in the layer DSpiInOut,
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Fig. 3 Layering structure of SPI bus driver
the module RegRW contains two functions for read-
ing and writing registers. The arrow between two
modules indicates the calling relation between them,
and a module is only allowed to call modules in the
lower layer. For example, the module CH0EN points to
(invokes) the module RegRW, and the module RegRW
points to the read and write interface of the SPI bus.
The blue block indicates that functions in this mod-
ule depend on at least one function in another mod-
ule. The white block represents the module which
is passed through from a lower layer without any
modification. For example, the module RegRW in
DSpiEnChannel is passed through directly from the
layer DSpiInOut. The module RegRW, which consists
of the read and write interface of the SPI bus, is
located at the bottom of the layer architecture.
We discuss the verification of these modules in
the next section.
3.3 Verification of the driver
In this subsection, we follow the methodology
proposed in (Gu et al., 2015) to verify the SPI driver.
3.3.1 Functional correctness of the C code
We show the C code for enabling the channel
and its corresponding Clight representation in Fig.
4. The main operation of the function is to write
value ENABLE_CHANNEL to the address CH0CTRL in
order to enable the SPI bus.
The workflow of proving the functional correct-
ness of a module is elaborated in Fig. 5. Clight-
gen, provided by Compcert(Leroy, 2009), is used to
translate the C code of SPI driver into a Clight ab-
void mcspi_enable_channel (void) {
write_register(ENABLE_CHANNEL, CH0CTRL);
}
Definition mcspi_enable_channel :=
(Scall None
(Evar MCSPI_write_register (Tfunction
(Tcons tuint (Tcons tuint Tnil)) tvoid cc_default))
((Econst_int (ENABLE_CHANNEL) tint) ::
(Econst_int (CH0CTRL) tint) :: nil))).
Fig. 4 The C source code and its Clight representation
(in Coq) of function mcspi_enable_channel
stract syntax tree. Then we write the Highspec and
Lowspec of the corresponding module in Coq (see
Fig. 5) to establish the refinement relation.
Fig. 5 Contextual refinement verification for a C func-
tion
The Highspec describes the desired functionality
of this module. For example, the above function
mcspi_enable_channel is abstracted as below.
Function σˆmcspi_enable_channel(abs: RData)
: option RData :=
match(spi abs)with
| SpiState _ SpiEN.en _ ->
Some(abs{spi:(SpiState _ SpiEn.Enable _)})
| _ -> None
end
Here, RData contains all states of the system,
such as the page table, the process control block, etc.
This function only updates spi, and abs.SpiState
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is an instance of spi. The enable bit(SpiEn) of the
SPI bus state(SpiState) will be changed from the
previous value to Enable, which describes the be-
havior of the SPI enable operation in the original C
code.
The Lowspec also abstracts the behavior of each
function in this module, but is specified in a way that
is closer to the concrete hardware. In the case of en-
abling the SPI bus, it looks very similar to the corre-
sponding Highspec because only function invocation
is involved. The following is the low specification of
the function mcspi_enable_channelwritten in Coq:
Inductive σˆLOWmcspi_enable_channel(abs abs′:RData)
(m0:mem) :=
|σˆmcspi_enable_channelabs = Some abs′->
σˆLOWmcspi_enable_channel(m0,abs) -> (m0,abs′).
Here, RData represents the abstract state and
mem represents the memory state. Notice that the
memory state, m0, does not change since this function
does not involve any direct memory operation. Thus,
the overall behavior is a transition from (m0,abs) to
(m0,abs’). Then we prove the refinement between
the Highspec and the Lowspec defined as follows:
Highspec ⊆ Lowspec :=
∀a, a′,m, (a Highspec−−−−−−→ a′) ∧ (a ∼ m)
⇒ ∃m′, (m Lowspec−−−−−→ m′) ∧ (a′ ∼ m′)
The Highspec and Lowspec may operate on dif-
ferent types of states, so that we use a, a′ and m, m′
to distinguish between the two. However, we estab-
lish a relation a ∼ m between two states on these two
different levels, which holds only if a is a valid ab-
straction of m. This refinement relation states that
if the Highspec takes one step from a to a′, and that
its initial state a is a proper abstraction of m, then
the corresponding Lowspec must be able to step from
m to m′, where the ∼ relation also holds between a′
and m′.
Similarly, we prove the refinement relation be-
tween the Lowspec and the actual C code. Combined
together, we get the refinement from the Highspec to
the actual C code, which is exactly its functional cor-
rectness proof.
As shown in Fig. 5, it is possible during the
verification process that we find certain refinement
relations do not hold. This is either due to a flaw
in the specification, which we need to revise and try
again, or is indeed caused by a bug in the source
code. In the latter case, we have to fix the bug so
that the functional correctness of the source code
could be verified.
3.3.2 Linking all layers together
The functional correctness proof of each layer
assumes the functional correctness of the layer below
it. Part of the layer architecture of the SPI bus driver
is presented in Fig. 6 to illustrate how we build up
the verification layer by layer.
Fig. 6 Verification of the SPI driver
The module CH0EN is first verified, mean-
ing the behavior of its C code indeed follows
its specification. It then serves as the in-
terface of layer DSpiEnChannel, which is in-
voked by layer DSpiSelChannel. Similarly, the
layer DSpiSelChannel also exposes the Highspec
CH0SELECT as part of its interface, which could be
used by upper layers.
Fig. 7 Refinement between abstract layers
The framework we use (Gu et al., 2015) enables
us to link layers together and prove the following
contextual refinement between layers. Assume that
P is a program which uses the function CH0SELECT.
As in Fig. 7, the behavior of linking P with the mod-
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Table 1 Configurations of three sensors of the drone*
Sensor Chip Name Measurement Range Sensitivity Sampling Rate
Accelerometer MPU9250 ±8 g 4096 LSB/g 200 Hz
Gyroscope MPU9250 ±1000 dps 32.8 LSB/dps 200 Hz
Magnetometer HMC5883 ±1.3 Gs 1090 LSB/Gs 75 Hz
∗ Taken from datasheets of MPU9250 and HMC5883.
g: standard gravity; dps: degree per second; Gs: gauss; LSB: least significant bit
ule CH0SELECT (written as P⊕ CH0SELECT) and run-
ning them on the layer DSpiEnChannel is equivalent
to the behavior of running program P on the layer
DSpiSelChannel (written as P@DSpiSelChannel).
We can write the refinement between these two exe-
cutions as follows:
P@DSpiSelChannel ⊆
P⊕ CH0SELECT@DSpiEnChannel.
Once this refinement is proved, the actual im-
plementation of the function CH0SELECT is hidden
under the layer DSpiSelChannel, while we are still
able to reason about all behaviors of program P.
Finally, we use Compcert (Leroy, 2009) to gen-
erate assembly code for all verified modules, which
carries the functional correctness property all the
way down to the assembly code level (Gu et al.,
2015).
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Methods and procedures
A drone (Fig. 8) was built for all experiments.
Three basic sensors, including an accelerometer, a
gyroscope and a magnetometer were used to estimate
the attitude of the drone. Their configurations are
listed in Table 1. A radio telemetry was used to
record the flight data. Experiments were designed in
this section to simulate erroneous situations or bugs
of bus drivers. We set up the system so that bugs
occur every 5-10 seconds, whose effect is to delay the
execution of the driver code for as long as 0.2 seconds.
This simulates the situation when the driver keeps
polling for new data without enforcing any timeout
mechanism. In this case, an anomaly in the device
may block the driver for a long time, which in turn
blocks the execution of the whole system.
Two drone systems are tested in the real field
and the results are further compared. The first sys-
tem is the drone system with a verified SPI bus driver
Fig. 8 Drone used in experiments
as explained in the previous section. The second one
is a system with unverified SPI bus driver. Both of
these two systems are equipped with the verified I2C
bus driver.
Ten trials have been carried out with different
bugs randomly occurring in the SPI bus driver. We
record and compare attitudes of the drone (roll, pitch
and yaw) since they are the most critical metrics to
its safety. The attitudes are computed by the same
gradient descent method(Madgwick et al., 2011) us-
ing IMU data read from the SPI bus.
4.2 Results and discussions
Fig. 9 shows the roll angles of the unverified
drone system. Solid lines in subfigure ‘Roll Angle’
represent the computed actual roll angles while
dashed lines represent the desired values required
by the remote controller. The differences between
the actual and desired value (errors) are shown in
subfigure ‘Roll Angle Error’. Three peaks of errors
are observed in the timeline 8.6s, 16.8s and 28.5s.
At these time intervals, software bugs in the device
drivers cause delayed process and response of sensor
data, which further blocks the controller’s execution
for the next multiple control periods. Software bugs
are also detected at 1.8s and 23.2s in the timeline
(subfigure ‘SPI Bus Bug’). However, these bugs have
no obvious impact on the roll angle, due to the rela-
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Fig. 9 Roll angle response of drone with unverified
SPI bus driver
Fig. 10 Pitch angle response of drone with unverified
SPI bus driver
tively steady attitude of the drone. When these bugs
occur, the input of each motor will be the same as
it in the previous period. If the current attitude of
the drone doesn’t change a lot comparing with the
previous one, the drone will stay stable by using the
same motor input. The same phenomenon exists on
the pitch angle as shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 11 shows the value of the yaw angle, which
does not experience the same variation upon software
faults caused by bugs. It is attributed to the sensor
fusion algorithm, which uses data from both the IMU
(connected with the SPI bus) and the magnetometer
(connected to the I2C bus) to improve the accuracy
of estimated yaw angle.
Fig. 11 Yaw angle response of drone with unverified
SPI bus driver
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12 Comparison of attitude errors in two drone
systems
Fig. 12 shows comparison of attitude errors be-
tween these two drone systems. The exists of soft-
ware bugs leads to significant differences between de-
sired and actual pitch and roll angle.
Fig. 13 shows a series of snapshots for different
drone flights in a consequent timeline. Drones in the
first two rows have installed verified device drivers.
It could hover, and is able to change its attitude and
fly forward. The third row shows the situation when
there are bugs in the drone’s SPI bus driver. The pic-
tures show greater variations of the drone’s attitude
compared to the first and second rows, even if they
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(a) Snapshots of drone flights
(b) Variation of drone attitude
Fig. 13 An empirical comparison between systems with/without a verified SPI bus driver
are operated in the same manner. This demonstrates
that bugs in the SPI bus driver indeed degrades the
stability of a drone.
5 CONCLUSIONS
A new software architecture and development
method targeting at safety and reliability for a drone
system is proposed in this paper. With the help of
formal verification, several bus drivers which play
critical roles in the flight control are formally veri-
fied. Experiments in the filed tests show that the
proposed system enjoys the improved reliability by
eliminating the subtle bugs that could be introduced
in the software development.
In our future work, we plan to extend the pro-
posed architecture with virtualization support. A
hypervisor could be introduced to support third-part
systems without compromising the inherited safety
and security by enforcing strong isolation and non-
interference properties.
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